

The Rhetorical Function of Poetry: *Segismundo's* Ingenious Thought and Philosophical Metaphor

The foundation for the following text is our interpretation of the *ingenious method* in Baltasar Gracían, published several years ago in the U.S.A.¹ Gracían's *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* of 1642/1648 had always been reduced by critics to its purely formal and its aesthetic aspects. For Menéndez y Pelayo, Gracían's work was the "codex of poetical intellectualism."² Benedetto Croce judges Gracían to be the theorist of literary *conceptismo*, which consists of "the literary form considered as an ingenious and pleasant ornament, added to the naked expression of thought."³ We showed, in our above mentioned interpretation, that *ingenium* and its concepts cannot be relegated to the status of mere formal and decorative additions to rational expression. We now intend to explain the rhetorical function of Gracían's ingenious method using, as an example, the philosophical comedy *Life is a Dream*.

The assertion that the 17th century was the "Golden Age" of Spanish literature has meanwhile become the standard view of literature. However, to be more precise, one would have to appreciate that the gold of this epoch was nothing more than the gold of its imagery. Concepts such as baroque, *conceptismo* or *culteranismo* have long lost their strength and colour and require restauration. How is it possible to forget that, like the exponents of Spanish paintings who were contemporaries, our classical authors—Cervantes, Góngora, Quevedo, Lope de Vega, Gracían or Calderón—speak, think, argue, invent and write primarily in images?

Within this epoch, word and image embody one and the same reality. Hence, *The Surrender of Breda* (1625), for instance, is depicted simultaneously by Calderón (1625) and Velázquez (1634/35). In his little known treatises on painting (1677),⁴ Calderón examines the relationships which interpose between painting and the seven free arts. They all contribute in some manner to painting; however,

those whose special medium is the word do so more directly than others: "Therefore grammar contributes its concordances to painting; dialectics its consequences; rhetoric its powers of persuasion; poetry its art of inventiveness; (. . .) therefore, who can doubt that the painting is, as the collective entirety of all the arts, the prime art, which includes everything?"⁵ He pays special note to the art of persuasion, the object and the aim of rhetoric, in which poetry and painting indeed also have a share. "For it (painting) is silent rhetoric; its painted words persuade, its articulated lines no less so; what greater means of eloquence can, then, therefore exist, other than that which it represents?"⁶

In the case of the theatre, the effect of the word is intensified by the visual image. In Calderón's works, as in Gracían's, the search for rhetorical elements and the transfer of knowledge is realized through the keenness (*agudeza*) of the *ingenium*, whose special inventive means and tools of communication are the *conceptuosas imágenes*.⁷ These images belong to the fundamental structure of keenness and all ingenious *conceptos*, which Gracían examines in his rhetoric or rather his *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* (keenness and the *ingenium*'s art). In this respect the following *conceptos*, among many others, deserve special note: the *conceptos por correspondencia y proporción* (cf. O. C. 247), *agudeza por semejanza* (O. C. 277), *ingeniosas transposiciones* (O. C. 313), *agudeza crítica* (O. C. 335), *conceptos por ficción* (O. C. 406), *argumentos conceptuosos* (O. C. 412), and the *conceptos compuestos por metáforas* (O. C. 467).

In a letter to Schiller, Goethe imparts the impression that the imagery in *The Steadfast Prince* made on him: "If poetry should be totally lost to the world, then one could restore it from this play."⁸ However, if, according to Goethe, Calderón embraces in this work the total constellation and all the possibilities of poetry, then one would have to ask where the special features of his dramatic method and language lie. Schelling had already seen, before Goethe, the key to Calderón's creativeness in the "inexplicable reasoning in the construction" and in the "genius of creative inventiveness."⁹ Schelling's phrase "Genie in der Erfindung" is not in the least a contradiction, nor does it mean that there can be no unity among philosophy, rhetoric and poetry. Since in Calderón's works this inventiveness is the result of a method which bears the same mark and function as *arte de*

ingenio of Gracían, it would be perfectly legitimate, even necessary, to reflect upon the work of our dramatist.

One can probably regard Calderón's theatre as the realization of the logic and the rhetoric of the *ingenium*, as developed by Gracían. The *conceptismo* is evident in Calderón's work. His method and language integrate into a system, whose expressive structure is well accessible to the audience. According to Gracían, there is no *art* without *ingenium*, without *matter* and without *example*.¹⁰ An examination of the inherent structure of this inventive rhetoric requires subject *matter* in our case also. The theme of man and the originality of his dramatic art, or his method, seem, from a philosophical perspective, to form the two main points in Calderón's works.

In reference to subject, and therefore to man, the world in *The Great Theatre of the World* becomes, in theatrical terms, the object of representation, only because man dwells in it. This also occurs in the philosophical comedy *Life is a Dream*, which deals with the problem of existence and freedom. The answer to the question of human freedom precedes the argument. In addition, the question of God, which in Calderón appears as the horizon of human strife for eternity, presupposes previous knowledge of the ego and its earthly stage, its circumstance (*circum-stantia*).

Without using deduction, without paying notes to dogmatic principles, Calderón opts for quick means—using examples, symbols, allegory and metaphors. He thus portrays in a vivid manner to his audience, conveying in a richly inventive language, his philosophical message of the limitations of man. This transference of his thoughts occurs in *conceptos*, which are clearer, more familiar and more effective and, therefore, correspond to the keenness, taste and logical structure of the *ingenium* of the audience. Considering the large number of his plays (almost 200), and his continual use of the method of the *ingenium*, it would be completely beyond the scope of this essay to specify all Calderón's *conceptos* and inventive expressions of *correspondencias* with respect to man.

Let us turn our attention to the comedy *Life is a Dream*. The reason for our choice is not only the metaphor in the title, which at the same time forms the theme and the main argument, nor is it only the fact that it constitutes the transfer of one of the fundamental aims in Gracían's ingenious logic. The principal reason for this choice is

that this work is above all the best known of all Calderón's poetry and will therefore facilitate our understanding of the analysis.

Segismundo represents Man wrestling for his freedom. The problem arises as to the possibility or impossibility of changing his fate. Once again Calderón seizes upon the theological discussion of *free will* which at his time was an object of rational and metaphysical controversy between the Thomists (e.g. Báñez) and the Jesuits (e.g. Molina). Our author arrives at a mid-way solution, in that he defends man's relative freedom. He repeats precisely this view again in his *auto The Great Theatre of the World*. By contrasting the image of the dream with reality, Calderón accentuates Segismundo's existential dualism, he being the Prince of Poland who is ruled by the stars and, at the same time, by the irrevocable authority of the King, his father Basilio.

Dramatic impression, effective harmony between argumentation and the logical and rhetorical structure of *Life is a Dream* depend primarily on the degree of unison between all the different dramatic means, in particular with regard to the *ingenium* and its language. If one qualifies Calderón's poetry as "syllogistic precision" and "rhymed logic,"¹¹ then one faces the danger of misunderstanding the manifold wealth of his work. Calderón undoubtedly employs the structure of syllogism, but it is just as true to say that this is not an inventive means for him; neither is it a true communication of his *conceptos*. It is exclusively a simple device for a pseudo-rational arrangement of arguments. Since syllogism, in the hands of neoscholasticism, enjoys philosophical prestige, it is used by Calderón to render a certain authority to the inventiveness of the *ingenium*. In contrast to general opinion in this field of research, Calderón's syllogism appears to be a purely formal cosmetic aid for his philosophical thinking and this, as in Gracían, is ingenious.

In Calderón's theatre, image, metaphor, analogy and symbol obviously have an indispensable function as tools of *agudeza* and *argumentos*. These inventive means are a basic element of his ingenious logic and together form the fundamental structure of his philosophy. In *Life is a Dream*, that which composes the truth of the discourse and its effect lies in the *acumen* of the *ingenium*, or rather in the results of his *inventio*. The invented elements emerge therefore within the compact scheme of rational categorical syllogism, which in its

uncreative stream could not produce anything at all new in its *conclusio* without these elements. If "life is a dream," then the tautology of the minor premise and the *conclusio* precede this major premise in general validity, which through subtle keenness of the *ingenium* has already been surpassed. "Segismundo and his father are people," so "their life is a dream" (*conclusio*). The poetical correlation and the ingenious images in Calderón override, however, the boundaries of literature, in order to partake in the essential aspect of the method of cognition and the line of argument. The object depicted, its forms and colours, are not, however, expressions of *ratio*, but of *correspondencias* and *conceptos imaginativos* of the *ingenium*.

How can one then explain inventive creativity? At what point in the dramatic plot does it emerge? In Calderón the premise indeed works under the condition that it is the result of an inventive process, in which one discovers the real relationship between more familiar things and the object (*materia*) from which one will form a *concepto* in a concrete situation and by inductive means. In his knowledge, Segismundo never abandons either his ego or his circumstances. He perceives life the way it is,—in movement—and denies every intention, in an *adaequatio*, to recognize and return to an existence the *res*, since this can never be a constant unity either within himself or in the subject of knowledge. Calderón's philosophy of life on the temporal and historical impression made by human life is different from rational egalitarianism.

The Spanish dramatist is conscious of the fact that the origin of invention lies in the ingenious method of seeing the connections between objects and their circumstances. The responsibility falls to the *ars inveniendi* to seek the necessary elements for the syllogistic statement. By allowing the metaphor *life-dream* universal validity, we can neither forget the free movement and its semantic, nor the relative value of an incomplete number of individual relationships unfolded in the metaphor. Individual events, in their meanings, relationships, existence, etc., are immeasurable quantitatively and qualitatively. This scale of relativity corresponds to real situations both of the human intellect as well as of rhetorical language, and it belongs to one of Gracían's clearest convictions of *arte de ingenio* as well as to Calderón's dramatic art.

It is precisely in the metaphor that *inventio* finds its own linguistic

representation. The fact that man is engineer of his own world is a special privilege of human creativity. Man, master of his *ingenium*, possesses the capacity, in the main stream of the river of imaginative words, to allow the stream of meanings, which spring from things only apparently separate or dissimilar, to converge. In reality, and in the eyes of the imagination, the objects are united in their source, their direction of flow and their orifice by a number of relationships, which, as in a spider's web, form this *correspondencia* and their distinctive quality. *Semejanza* and *proporción* are normally the most frequent to occur among the manifold *relaciones*. These find their parallel correspondence in the type and form of *agudeza* or, rather, ingenious process. Gracían assures that "simile or metaphor, be it because of the taste of their artistic skill, be it due to the simplicity of adaptation through terms often sublime in which one transfers the subject or the one it resembles, would appear to be the usual workshop of *discursos*, and although so mundane, one comes across *conceptos* in it, which is made extraordinary by the wonder of unity and contrast."¹² Analogous relationships converge under the roof of the metaphor. *Ingenium* and taste succeed in crystallizing these relationships in the keen *conceptos* of the argument. Metaphors were not originally products of the aesthetic artistic skill of the *ingenium*, but were formed in reply to the necessity to procure new *conceptos*, when there was a lack of a word to describe something.¹³ Such ingenious artistic skill forms an essential part of the human task, whose primary aim is language, with all its possibilities of rhetorical and philosophical creation. Since the metaphor serves as an indispensable instrument of discovering, of naming the "unknown" thing by transferring meanings already known, its function exceeds aestheticism and overlaps into the sphere of philosophy. With its aid we are able to achieve cognitive *apprehendere* of the *res*, to grasp that which exists outside the special cases of *ratio* and which escape our logical rational principles.

The philosophical statement and transferred meaning of the dream-life metaphor proves to be an expression of the fantasy. Segismundo's subtle and keen penetration, a prerequisite of transfer in *Life is a Dream*, precedes every premise of rational streams of thought. If it is, therefore, imagination and its images which agitate on Calderón's stage as the protagonists, then they always present their roles in or-

derly and unified partnership with reason and its concepts.

Life is a Dream deals with a concrete situation in life. It is about loneliness in the figure of the mythical Segismundo, who incorporates the original sense of abandonment. He is surrounded by partly similar beings who, however, since they are not the same as he, make dialogue impossible. The dramatic action of our figure does not arise from the ideas of loneliness, or rational proceedings which could ease the abstract nature of the circumstances, but from lively reality and experience. From his forced loneliness, Segismundo experiences the absence of freedom. Yet he cannot achieve a realization of his needs and his legal claim to freedom by deduction because he lacks "equals"—people whom he indeed does not know. And it is just this impossibility of relating language and thought in which the roots for the absolute necessity for the monologue lie. Confused, powerless against his own living conditions, Segismundo, with a disillusioned cry throwing open the gates of his monologue, turns questioningly to his unknown fate:

Ay mísero de mí, y ay infeliz!
 Apurar, Cielos, pretendo,
 ya que me tratáis así,
 qué delito cometí
 contra vosotros naciendo;
 aunque si nací, ya entiendo
 qué delito he cometido;
 bastante causa ha tenido
 vuestra justicia y rigor,
 pues el delito mayor
 del hombre es haber nacido

Oh, wretched me! Alas, unhappy man!
 I strive, oh Heav'n, since I am treated so,
 To find out what my crime against thee was
 In being born; although in being born
 I understand just what my crime has been.
 Thy judgment harsh has had just origin:
 To have been born is mankind's greatest sin.¹⁴

Conscious of the absence of a partner, Segismundo traverses the new paths alone, which satisfy his thirst for knowledge. His method is similar to that which Andrenio¹⁵ also employed as he tried to form a *concepto* of his own hell of nothingness. This initial look introduces us to the world of the image and the possibilities for interpreting

reality to which rational thinking has no access. With the first steps of ingenious knowledge, Segismundo achieves a precise perception of each individual aspect of the objects which surround him in the tower. While he ascertains similarities and differences between them, he discovers that some have the exact attributes he does not possess and that he, without understanding their nature, laments:

Sólo quisiera saber,
para apurar mis desvelos
—dejando a una parte, cielos,
el delito del nacer—,
¿qué más os pude ofender,
para castigarme más?
¿No nacieron los demás?,
pues si los demás nacieron,
¿qué privilegios tuvieron
que yo no gocé jamás?

I only seek to know, to ease my grief,
(Now setting to one side the crime of birth)
In what way greater, Heav'n, could I offend,
To merit from thee greater punishment?
Were not all others born? If so, in fine,
What dispensation theirs that was not mine?¹⁶

Here ends his lament, his questioning, a sentimental conclusion for his painful ignorance, whose only partner is the silence of this place shrouded in mystery. It is within this framework surrounding Segismundo that Calderón finds a possibility for cognitive dialectics (of the ingenious dialogue), which permits Segismundo to understand his own world. His sense, his power of imagination and the courage to understand free him from the chains of ignorance. Since his reason is excluded, due to a lack of general concepts, rational argumentation proves to be an inappropriate method. In respect to the missing object (freedom) and other people, only one possible answer remains: the unveiling of existing harmonies between himself and his environment. In his penetration, the *acumen* hits upon the heart of the similarities with which the *ingenium* paves the way for the inventiveness of its arguments. The actual function of the metaphor is none other than to make it possible to recognize a less well-known object through another better-known thing.¹⁷ And so Segismundo sees the similarities and differences between things.

This factor separates the rational from the ingenious knowledge. The arguments of the hero, who demands freedom, begin out of necessity directly afterwards. Beautifully, and at the same time full of rich truth, Segismundo continues:

Nace el ave, y con las galas
que le dan belleza suma,
apenas es flor de pluma,
o ramillete con alas,
cuando las etéras salas
corta con velocidad,
negándose a la piedad
del nido que deja en calma;
¿y teniendo yo más alma,
tengo menos libertad?
Nace el bruto, y con la piel
que dibujan manchas bellas,
apenas signo es de estrellas
—gracias al docto pincel—
cuando, atrevido y cruel,
la humana necesidad
le enseña a tener crueldad,
monstruo de su laberinto;
¿y yo con mejor instinto
tengo menos libertad?
nace el pez, que no respira,
aborto de ovas y lamas,
y apenas bajel de escamas
sobre las ondas se mira,
cuando a todas partes gira,
midiendo la inmensidad
de tanta capacidad
como le da el centro frío;
¿y yo, con más albedrío,
tengo menos libertad?
Nace el arroyo, culebra
que entre flores se desata,
y apenas sierpe de plata,
entre las flores se quiebra,
cuando músico celebra
de las flores la piedad
que la dan la majestad
del campo abierto a su huida;
¿y teniendo yo más vida,

tengo menos libertad?
 En llegando a esta pasión,
 un volcán, un Etna hecho,
 quisiera sacar del pecho
 pedazos del corazón:
 ¿qué ley, justicia o razón
 negar a los hombres sabe
 privilegio tan süave,
 excepción tan principal,
 que Dios le ha dado a un cristal,
 a un pez, a un bruto y a un ave?

Birds are born, rich garbed in hues that give
 Them brilliant beauty; then, when scarcely more
 Than feathered flow'rs or plumèd garlands, breast
 The vault of air with speedy wing, and leave
 The shelt'ring nest forlorn. And what of me?
 Should I, with soul much greater, be less free?
 Beasts are born, their skin all mottled o'er
 With lovely colors; then, when scarcely more
 Than starry patches, limned with learnèd brush,
 The needs of man instruct them to be bold,
 Cruel monsters in their lair. And what of me?
 Should I, with higher instincts, be less free?
 Fish are born, unbreathing spawn of ooze
 And slimy seaweed; then, when scarcely more
 Than tiny boats with scales upon the waves,
 They swim away to measure all the vast
 Cold limits of the deep. And what of me?
 Should I, with greater free will, be less free?
 Streams are born, and serpent-like uncoil
 Among the flow'rs; then, when scarcely more
 Than silv'ry snakes, they wind away and sing
 In tuneful praise the rustic majesty
 Stretched open to their flight. And what of me?
 Should I, with life much longer, be less free?
 And as I reach this angry pitch I burn
 With Etna's fierce volcanic fires, and want
 To tear my heart in pieces from my breast.
 What law, what reason can deny to man
 That gift so sweet, so natural, that God
 Has giv'n a stream, a fish, a beast, a bird?¹⁸

The acumen in *conceptos* achieved here by the author clearly surpasses the boundaries of a premise and any general declaration of

reason. In each one of the 50 octosyllables, we perceive the line of the argument. Gracían shows in his *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* that "every kind of acumen which participates in an argument or a discourse is more ingenious because this *agudeza* is here the object of the principal act of the mind."¹⁹ The selection which Segismundo makes among those four ingredients of the argument reflects good taste. Those visible symbols selected serve as a mirror in which he, seeing himself from his own perspective of life, recognizes himself as dissimilar. The *ingenium* forms a *concepto* out of this dissimilarity, "showing the difference which exists between the unlike subject and the term to which it is dissimilar."²⁰

The bird, wild animal, fish and stream symbolize the subject matter and simultaneously the origin of the argument. The author presents many *conceptos*, from small to large, in order to express the opposite situation to the sought after object: Segismundo's denial of freedom. However, since symbols exist in function with man, the captured prince discovers them and transfers them, compares the image with the one represented and gathers in symbols their correspondences. These correspondences then permit him to experience a cognitive revelation and show him the ability to express what he has understood. If, in the general feeling of the audience, the bird graphically symbolizes spatial freedom and independence of movement, then the choice of such an image and the transference of its meaning corresponds to the need to express this contrast ingeniously, for the benefit of cognition. This contrast, because it is not rational, cannot be understood by a logical ordering of reason.

The symbols and metaphors in the monologue serve the illustration, the expressive tension and the speed of transference, which by bringing to mind the subject and object, corresponds to the structure demanded. The similar and dissimilar relationships are found here to be creatures of different types in other words, beyond any possibility of definition. The choice of images, their comparison and the transferred meaning through metaphor are not arbitrary, for they correspond without exception to the common denominator of the argument—freedom.

After Segismundo has compiled (*sybállein*) the symbols and images which manifest the perception of the differences in his last lines, he finishes with a cry to the incomprehensible law, to justice and to

the mystery of reason, which have denied him the privileges, "that God has giv'n a stream, a fish, a beast, a bird." Each and every metaphor of the passage expresses a coming closer to the objects in a moment of comparison. In contrast to the concepts of traditional logic, the metaphors are not demonstrative judgements. Through *metaphérein* we present that which is most obvious or best known (fish, bird, etc.), in order to bring the hidden object into light and discover the object of cognition. In Calderón's rhetoric, without exception, philosophical argumentation follows the image. The ingenious language obtains once more its own original keenness and lucidity, when it illustrates the existential connections between objects.

Transferences, as bridges of meaning, rescue us from the indefinable. They are not the perception and expression of that which definition cannot explain (the individual object) and which one cannot deduce from another object. The diverse functions of the metaphor and its actual character do not only depend on a search for the meaning of unknown objects, but also on the spectrum of possibilities which circumstances can offer in order to reinstate cognitive and linguistic communication with the ciphered object. Metaphorical craftsmanship always begins with perception and a choice of similar relationships, in other words, with the activity of the *ingenium* and good taste. In his method of forming *concepto*, Segismundo uses that truth, which Ortega in his philosophical equations of life concluded as being "*I am myself and my circumstance*, and if I do not save it, then I can not save myself either."²¹ Seen from this angle, the possibilities of the metaphor could be just as numerous as the correspondences, which the *res* carries in itself. Grassi illustrates the experience of the metaphor and its disparity with rational thinking in two forms of human behaviour: in dance and in game. The transference of the meaning "through the human body, its movements and through rhythm" is not the same as that of the game: "through devising rules, which include space, time and objects, a new order is achieved, which lifts the player out of daily reality."²²

In the monologue, the object of cognition (Segismundo's freedom) is hidden or, rather, not present. His yearning for freedom forces him to look for the light of truth in the most immediate circumstances outside himself. In the cognitive fulfillment of this destitution, he is only

equipped with his feelings, but lacking the general concepts of his impotent reason. This search does not, in our case, approximate any tradition for which the essentials of truth are based in rational *adaequatio*. Concordance, as in the Spanish *estar de acuerdo* (from *cor*), or also in the other romance languages, cannot only be expressed by reason or understanding. It originally meant the correspondence of the heart and senses, images, or, as in music, voices and sounds. Due to the impossibility of defining something in such a concrete situation, or of using a logical line of reasoning, Calderón strives to grasp in *conceptos* that which is self-revealing of "the unhidden" *aletheia* in birds or in a stream, etc. In actual fact, Segismundo cannot know the reason for the deprivation of his freedom. Yet he fully understands how the present objects of his attention move in freedom.

Modern rational man refuses to admit that thought very often needs to be conveyed metaphorically. The effect of the metaphor does not end in verbal transference; it is, beyond this, an inventive act, whose essential function is cognitive. It is a perception of the relativity in reality, exactly of that which goes beyond the scope of reason, but is within that sphere which can be penetrated by the *ingenium* and imagination. Yet it is not enough to trace relationships. In order for them to serve our argument, they must be objects of cognition of the *acumen* of the *ingenium*. By perceiving links which keep him in harmony with his circumstances, Segismundo forms a *concepto* of his dissimilarity. An example for this logical *artificio ingenioso* is his lively and effective identification and description of similar relationships.

When he calls the bird a flower with plumage, we ascertain the creation of a new object of the imagination; out of the three real images "bird," "flower" and "plumage" arises a new one: "bird—flower with plumage." None of these three words has its own meaning here. They only exist in order to serve reality and the new meaning conveyed through the image. This meaning (Segismundo's *concepto*) does not correspond to anything other than the actual similarity between bird and flower. It was chosen in order to illustrate his own dissimilarity (that is, not being free, although he does believe himself to possess more soul and being than the bird). Bird and flower represent freedom in their delicate bodies. Their blossom, their plumage,

their leaves and wings symbolize their freedom. Yet the concept of freedom is extended through the image of a bouquet of flowers with wings (bird), which moves through ethereal space in the firmament with ease and without limitation through windows and doors.

Segismundo continues his inductive argumentation in a similar way. He gathers and transforms in his monologue as many similarities as he perceives around him. Gracían confirms, "when all circumstances (. . .) of the subject freely approximate to the transferred image and with such unison that each part of the metaphor is a relevant *concepto*, then the compilation of *conceptos* has reached its utmost perfection."²³ Throughout the entire monologue, necessarily rich in metaphors, the choice of brook in its dissimilarity to the three animals does not at first appear to offer any relation to freedom at all.

Calderón embraces the form and flow of the brook with the help of the image of the snake. It "frees itself," fleeing in zig-zag form, and then becomes a "silv'ry snake." The brook gives its thanks among the procession of flowers and plants on its banks which also experience its unconstrained movements. It "sings" uninterruptedly during the prince's lament:

And what of me?
Should I, with life much longer, be less free?

NOTES

- 1 Cf. E. Hidalgo-Serna, "The Philosophy of 'Ingenium': Concept and Ingenious Method in Balthasar Gracían," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13.4 (1980) 245-63.
- 2 M. Menéndez y Pelayo, "Poética conceptista: Baltasar Gracían." *Obras Completas, Historia de las ideas estéticas en España*, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1950) 355.
- 3 B. Croce, "I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e Baltasar Gracían," *Problemi di estetica e contributi alla storia dell'estetica italiana* (Bari, 1940) 313.
- 4 P. Calderón de la Barca, "Tratado defendiendo la nobleza de la pintura," *Cajón de Sastre literario*, vol. 4, ed. F. M. Nipho (Madrid, 1781).
- 5 Calderón, "Tratado" 33.
- 6 Calderón, "Tratado" 30.
- 7 B. Gracían, "El Criticón," *Obras Completas*, ed. Arturo del Hoyo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1967), 524. In the following, Gracían is cited only from this edition.
- 8 *Goethes Briefe*, vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1964) 464.
- 9 *Aus Schellings Leben, in Briefen*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1869) 423.
- 10 Gracían, "Agudeza y arte de ingenio" 514-16.

- 11 A. Machado, "El 'Arte Poética' de Juan de Mairena," *Obras Completas*, (Madrid, 1952) 957.
- 12 Gracían, "Agudeza y arte de ingenio" 467.
- 13 "Necessitas est, quum deest verbum quo res significetur." J. L. Vives, *De ratione dicendi, Opera omnia*, vol. 2 (Valencia: G. Maynas, 1782-1790) 99-100.
- 14 P. Calderón de la Barca, "La vida es sueño," *Obras Completas*, ed. A. Valbuena Prat, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1952) 366-67. Translation by William E. Colford, *Life is a Dream. La vida es sueño* (Woodbury, 1958) 4.
- 15 Gracían, "El Criticón" 525-26.
- 16 Calderón, "La vida es sueño" 367; *Life is a Dream* 4.
- 17 "Similitudo ad explicationem inventa est rei minus notae per magis notam." Vives 99. "Transferuntur ea (metaphor) quae similia esse judicantur." Vives 99.
- 18 Calderón, "La vida es sueño" 367; *Life is a Dream* 4-5.
- 19 Gracían, "Agudeza y arte de ingenio" 351.
- 20 Gracían, "Agudeza y arte de ingenio" 294.
- 21 J. Ortega y Gasset, *Meditaciones del Quijote*, (Madrid, 1963) 18.
- 22 E. Grassi, *Die Macht der Phantasie*, (Königstein/Ts., 1979) 54
- 23 Gracían, "Agudeza y arte de ingenio" 468.